





Certification Report HP MFP M525 et al

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1 Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation, TOE, is the firmware of a multifunction printer, MFP, with the exception of the operating system and the crypto module implementation. Six versions of the multifunction printer are included in the scope of the evaluation: the LaserJet MFP M525, M725, M830 (black and white), the Color LaserJet MFP M575, M775, and M880 (color). These multifunction printers provide fax, copying, scanning, and network printing functionality. The network connections and the print jobs are protected by encryption, and stored jobs may only be printed. Scanned documents can be sent by e-mail, to an FTP server, a shared network folder, or to a Sharepoint site (flow MFP models only).

The evaluated security features include administrator and user identification and authentication, PIN or password protected encryption of jobs, and IPSec protected network communication.

The implementation of the cryptographic module is outside the scope of the evaluation, but the effect of cryptographic function calls from the TOE has been verified. The USB interface is disabled in the evaluated configuration.

The ST claims conformance to:

2600.2 PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment B; Version 1.0; March 2009, in accordance with the NIAP CCEVS Policy Letter #20. The claim includes the following packages from the PP:

2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational Environment B

2600.2-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR) Functions, Operational Environment B

2600.2-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational Environment B

2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational Environment B

2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational Environment B

2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-Medium Interface Functions, Operational Environment B

The evaluation has verified demonstrable conformance to the PP and conformance to the package claims stated above.

The evaluation has been performed by atsec information security AB in their premises in Danderyd, Sweden, and to some extent in Austin, Texas, USA, and was completed on the 10th of June 2014. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Criteria, version 3.1, release 4, and the common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1, release 4. The evaluation was performed at the evaluation assurance level EAL 2, augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures.

atsec information security AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. atsec information security AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC according to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria evaluation.

The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive versions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results confirm the security claims in the Security Target [ST], and have been reached in agreement with the requirements of the Common Criteria and the Common Methodology for evaluation assurance level:

EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2.

The certification results only apply to the versions of the products indicated in the certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target [ST] are met.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CSEC or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate is either expressed or implied.

2 Identification

Certification Identification

| Certification ID | CSEC2014001 |
|--------------------------|---|
| Name and version of the | HP LaserJet Enterprise MFP M525 Series |
| certified IT product and | (M525dn w/optional fax, M525f, flow M525c) |
| the TOE | MFP firmware version 2302243_421977 |
| | JetDirect firmware version JDI23200024.FF |
| | HP Color LaserJet Enterprise MFP M575 Series |
| | (M575dn w/optional fax, M575f, flow M575c) |
| | MFP firmware version 2302243_421976 |
| | JetDirect firmware version JDI23200024.FF |
| | HP LaserJet Enterprise MFP M725 Series |
| | (M725dn w/optional fax, M725f, M725z, M725z+) |
| | MFP firmware version 2302243_421973 |
| | JetDirect firmware version JDI23200024.FF |
| | HP Color Enterprise LaserJet MFP M775 Series |
| | (M775dn w/optional fax, M775f, M775z, M775z+) |
| | MFP firmware version 2302243_421975 |
| | JetDirect firmware version JDI23200024.FF |
| | HP LaserJet Enterprise flow MFP M830 Series |
| | (M830z, M830z w/NFC & Wireless Direct) |
| | MFP firmware version 2302243_421971 |
| | JetDirect firmware version JDI23200024.FF |
| | HP Color LaserJet Enterprise flow MFP M880 Series |
| | (M880z, M880z+ w/NFC & Wireless Direct) |
| | MFP firmware version 2302243_421966 |
| | JetDirect firmware version JDI23200024.FF |
| Security Target | Hewlett-Packard LaserJet Enterprise MFP M525, |
| | M725, and M830 Series and Color LaserJet |
| | Enterprise MFP M575, M775, and M880 Series |
| | Firmware with Jetdirect Inside Security Target, |
| | Hewlett Packard, 2014-06-05, document version 2.0 |
| Assurance level | EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2 |
| Sponsor | Hewlett Packard |
| Developer | Hewlett Packard |
| | |

| ITSEF | atsec information security AB |
|--|---|
| Common Criteria version CEM version | 3.1 release 43.1 release 4 |
| Certification date | 2014-06-11 |

3 Security Policy

The TOE provides the following security services:

- Auditing
- Identification and Authentication
- Data Protection and Access Control
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE Access Protection
- Trusted Channel Communication and Certificate Management
- User and Access Management

3.1 Auditing

The TOE provides means to generate audit records for security relevant events.

3.2 Identification and Authentication

Console access requires user identification and authentication.

3.3 Data Protection and Access Control

Stored jobs are protected by PIN or password. In addition, the access to read, modify and delete operations are controlled based on user identity and job ownership.

3.4 Protection of the TSF

Restricted forwarding - the administrator may restrict the automatic forwarding of data, specifically fax forwarding and fax archiving.

The TOE contains a suite of self tests to verify the integrity of specific TSF data and the TOE executables.

In the evaluated configuration, the TOE system clock will synchronise with an NTP server.

3.5 TOE Access Protection

Control panel access is protected by administrator configurable inactivity timeout and an administrator selectable automatic logout after a user job has been started.

3.6 Trusted Channel Communication and Certificate Management

All network access to the TOE requires the use of an integrity and confidentiality protected trusted channel.

TOE provides a mechanism to import X.509 v3 certificates.

3.7 User and Access Management

An administrator has authority to manage security functionality, users, and the external authenticated servers.

4 Assumptions and Clarifications of Scope

4.1 Usage Assumptions

The Security Target [ST] makes three assumptions on the usage of the TOE.

A.USER.TRAINING - TOE users are aware of the security policies and the procedures of their organisation, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and procedures.

A.ADMIN.TRAINING - Administrators are aware of the security policies and the procedures of their organisation, and are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer's guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures.

A.ADMIN.TRUST - Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.

4.2 Environmental Assumptions

Seven assumptions on the environment are made in the Security Target.

A.ACCESS.MANAGED - The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE.

A.ADMIN.PC.SECURE - The administrative computer is in a physically secured and managed environment and only the authorised administrator has access to it.

A.USER.PC.POLICY - User computers are configured and used in conformance with the organisation's security policies.

A.DNS.RELIABLE - When the TOE resolves network hostnames to addresses with the Domain Name System, the Domain Name System provides reliable network addresses.

A.NTP.RELIABLE - When the TOE synchronizes time with the Network Time Protocol server, the Network Time Protocol server provides reliable time synchronization information.

A.SERVICES.RELIABLE - When the TOE uses any of the network services Kerberos, LDAP, SMTP, or syslog, these services provide reliable information and responses to the TOE.

A.WINS.RELIABLE - When the TOE resolves network hostnames to addresses with the Windows Internet Name Service, the Windows Internet Name Service provides reliable network addresses.

4.3 Clarification of Scope

The Security Target [ST] contains six threats, which have been considered during the evaluation.

T.DOC.DIS - User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorised persons.

T.DOC.ALT - User Document Data may be altered by unauthorised persons.

T.FUNC.ALT - User Function Data may be altered by unauthorised persons.

T.PROT.ALT - TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorised persons.

T.CONF.DIS - TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed by unauthorised persons.

T.CONF.ALT - TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorised persons.

5 Architectural Information

The TOE is the firmware of an enterprise network multifunction printer designed to be shared by many client computers and human users. It performs the functions of copying, faxing, printing, and scanning of documents. It can be connected to a local network through the embedded Jetdirect Inside print server's built-in Ethernet, to an analog phone line using its internal analog fax modem, or to a USB device using its USB port (but the use of which must be disabled in the evaluated configuration).



Figure 1: HCD physical diagram

Figure 1 shows a high-level physical diagram of an hardcopy device with the unshaded areas representing the TOE and the shaded areas indicating components that are part of the Operational Environment.

At the top of this figure is the Administrative Computer which connects to the TOE using Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) with X.509v3 certificates for both mutual authentication and for protection of data from disclosure and alteration. This computer can administer the TOE using the following interfaces over the IPsec connection:

- Embedded Web Server (EWS)
- Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
- Web Services:

- Open Extensibility Platform device (OXPd) Web Services
- WS-* Web Services

The HTTP-based EWS administrative interface allows administrators to remotely manage the features of the TOE using a web browser.

The Web Services allow administrators to manage the TOE using HP's Web Jetadmin application, which is part of the Operational Environment. The TOE supports both HP's Open Extensibility Platform device (OXPd) Web Services and certain WS-* Web Services (conforming to the WS-*standards defined by w3.org) accessed via the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) and Extensible Markup Language (XML).

The SNMP network interface allows administrators to remotely manage the TOE using external SNMP-based administrative applications like the HP Web Jetadmin administrative tool.

Printer Job Language (PJL) is used in a non-administrative capacity by the Administrative Computer. The Administrative Computer uses PJL to send print jobs to the TOE as well as to receive job status. In general, PJL supports password protected administrative commands, but in the evaluated configuration these commands are disabled. For the purposes of the evaluation, we define the PJL Interface as PJL data sent to port 9100.

Web Jetadmin uses the HTTP, OXPd, PJL, SOAP/XML, WS-*, and SNMP protocols to manage the TOE. Remote applications such as web browsers and Web Jetadmin are part of the Operational Environment, not part of the TOE.

The TOE protects all network communications with Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), which is part of the embedded Jetdirect Inside firmware. Though IPsec supports multiple authentication methods, in the evaluated configuration, both ends of the IPsec connection are authenticated using X.509v3 certificates. An identity certificate for the TOE must be created outside the TOE, signed by a Certificate Authority (CA), and imported (added) into the TOE with the Certificate Authority's CA certificate.

Because IPsec authenticates the computers (IPsec authenticates the computer itself; IPsec does not authenticate the individual users of the computer), access to the Administrative Computer should be restricted to TOE administrators only.

The TOE distinguishes between the Administrative Computer and Network Client Computers by using IP addresses, IPsec, and the embedded Jetdirect Inside's internal firewall. In the evaluated configuration, the number of Administrative Computers used to manage the TOE is limited to one and the Device Administrator Password must be set.

The TOE can also communicate with Authenticated Server Computers using IPsec.

The evaluated configuration supports the following SNMP versions:

- SNMPv1 read-only
- SNMPv2c read-only
- SNMPv3

Network Client Computers connect to the TOE using IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect the communication and to mutually authenticate. These client computers can send print jobs to the TOE using the PJL Interface as well as receive job status.

The TOE supports an optional analog telephone line connection for sending and receiving faxes. The Control Panel uses identification and authentication to control access for sending analog faxes. Because the fax protocol doesn't support authentication of incoming analog fax phone line users, anyone can connect to the analog fax phone line (unless the number has been added to the Blocked Fax Numbers list), but the only function an incoming fax phone line user can perform is to transmit a fax to the TOE.

The TOE protects stored jobs with either a 4-digit Job PIN or by accepting (and storing) an encrypted job from a user computer. Both protection mechanisms are optional by default and are mutually exclusive of each other if used. In the evaluated configuration, every job must either be assigned a 4-digit Job PIN or be an encrypted job.

The TOE also supports Microsoft SharePoint (flow MFP models only) and remote file systems for the storing of scanned documents. The TOE uses IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect the communications and to mutually authenticate to SharePoint and the remote file systems. For remote file system connectivity, the TOE supports the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and the Common Internet File System (CIFS) protocol. (SharePoint is HTTP-based.) The product is capable of encrypting stored document files according to the Adobe PDF specification.

The TOE's Control Panel supports both local and remote sign in methods. The local sign in method is called Local Device Sign In which supports individual user accounts. The user account information is maintained in the Local Device Sign In database within the TOE. The remote sign in methods are called LDAP Sign In and Windows Sign In (Kerberos). The TOE uses IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect both the LDAP and Kerberos communications.

Each HCD contains a user interface called the Control Panel. The Control Panel consists of a touch sensitive LCD screen, a physical power button, and a physical home screen button that are attached to the HCD. In addition, the flow MFP models include a computer keyboard as part of the Control Panel. The Control Panel is the physical interface that a user uses to communicate with the TOE when physically using the HCD. The LCD screen displays information such as menus and status to the user. It also provides virtual buttons to the user such as an alphanumeric keypad for entering usernames and passwords. When a user signs in at the Control Panel, a Permission Set is associated with their session which determines the functions the user is permitted to perform.

6 Documentation

The following documents are included in the scope of the TOE:

HP LaserJet Enterprise MFP M525 - User Guide [UG525]

HP LaserJet Enterprise flow MFP M525 - User Guide [UG525flow]

HP LaserJet Enterprise 500 color MFP M575 - User Guide [UG575]

HP LaserJet Enterprise color flow MFP M575 - User Guide [UG575flow]

HP LaserJet Enterprise MFP M725 - User Guide [UG725]

HP LaserJet Enterprise 700 color MFP M775 - User Guide [UG775]

HP LaserJet Enterprise flow MFP M830 - User Guide [UG830]

HP Color LaserJet Enterprise flow MFP M880 - User Guide [UG880]

TOE Download Instructions [Download]

Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for HP LaserJet MFPs - HP Color LaserJet Enterprise (M775, M880) MFP Series, HP LaserJet Enterprise (M525, M575, M725, M775, M830) MFP Series [CCcfg]

Common Criteria Administrator Operational Guide for HP LaserJet MFPs - HP Color LaserJet Enterprise (M775, M880) MFP Series, HP LaserJet Enterprise (M525, M575, M725, M775, M830) MFP Series [CCadm]

7 IT Product Testing

7.1 Developer Testing

The developer performed extensive testing of the security functionality as described by the security functional requirements in the Security Target, covering both IP v.4 and IP v.6, for all six hardcopy devices. The developer testing was performed in the developer's premises in Boise, Idaho, USA.

7.2 Evaluator Testing

The evaluators focused on two of the hardcopy devices (M830 and M880), which were tested in the developer's premises in Boise, Idaho, USA.

The evaluators used the developer's test setup and verified a sample of the developer's test cases.

The evaluators also devised and performed additional test cases to provide full coverage of the security functions and TSFI.

7.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing

The evaluators performed variations of the functional tests to search for vulnerabilities in the TOE, and performed vulnerability scans of the network interface of the TOE, covering TCP and UDP ports both for IP v.4 and IP v.6. Testing variations was performed on the hardcopy devices M830 and M880 in Boise, Idaho, USA, and the vulnerability scan was performed in the evaluator's facilities in Stockholm on the M575 hardcopy device.

8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE shall run on either the M525, M575, M725, M775, M830 or the M880 hard-copy device, and shall be configured in accordance with the CC Configuration Guide [CCcfg].

9 Results of the Evaluation

The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.

The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluator and determined that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].

The evaluators overall verdict is PASS.

The verdicts for the respective assurance classes and components are summarised in the following table:

| Assurance Class/Family | | Short name | Verdict |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------|------------|---------|
| Development | | ADV | PASS |
| | Security Architecture | ADV_ARC.1 | PASS |
| | Functional Specification | ADV_FSP.2 | PASS |
| | TOE Design | ADV_TDS.1 | PASS |
| Guidano | ce Documents | AGD | PASS |
| | Operational User Guidance | AGD_OPE.1 | PASS |
| | Preparative Procedures | AGD_PRE.1 | PASS |
| Life-cycle Support | | ALC | PASS |
| | CM Capabilities | ALC_CMC.2 | PASS |
| | CM Scope | ALC_CMS.2 | PASS |
| | Delivery | ALC_DEL.1 | PASS |
| | Flaw Remediation | ALC_FLR.2 | PASS |
| Security Target Evaluation | | ASE | PASS |
| | ST Introduction | ASE_INT.1 | PASS |
| | Conformance Claims | ASE_CCL.1 | PASS |
| | Security Problem Definition | ASE_SPD.1 | PASS |
| | Security Objectives | ASE_OBJ.2 | PASS |
| | Extended Components Definition | ASE_ECD.1 | PASS |
| | Security Requirements | ASE_REQ.2 | PASS |
| | TOE Summary Specification | ASE_TSS.1 | PASS |
| Tests | | ATE | PASS |
| | Coverage | ATE_COV.1 | PASS |
| | Functional Tests | ATE_FUN.1 | PASS |
| | Independent Testing | ATE_IND.2 | PASS |
| Vulnerability Assessment | | AVA | PASS |
| | Vulnerability Analysis | AVA_VAN.2 | PASS |

10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations

The evaluators do not have any comments or recommendations concerning the product or using the product.

11 Glossary

| AES | Advanced Encryption Standard |
|--------|---|
| AH | Authentication Header (IPsec) |
| CBC | Cipher Block Chaining |
| CIFS | Common Internet File System |
| CRV | Constrained Random Verification |
| CTS | Cipher Text Stealing |
| DNS | Domain Name System |
| ESP | Encapsulating Security Payload (IPsec) |
| EWS | Embedded Web Server |
| FTP | File Transfer Protocol |
| HCD | Hardcopy Device |
| HMAC | Hashed Message Authentication Code |
| HP | Hewlett-Packard |
| HTML | Hypertext Markup Language |
| http | Hypertext Transfer Protocol |
| IEĒE | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. |
| IKE | Internet Key Exchange (IPsec) |
| IP | Internet Protocol |
| IPsec | Internet Protocol Security |
| ISAKMP | Internet Security Association Key Management Protocol (IPsec) |
| LCD | Liquid Crystal Display |
| LDAP | Lightweight Directory Access Protocol |
| MAC | Message Authentication Code |
| MFP | Multifunction Product |
| NTP | Network Time Protocol |
| OXP | Open Extensibility Platform |
| OXPd | OXP device layer |
| PIN | Personal Identification Number |
| PJL | Printer Job Language |
| PML | Printer Management Language |
| PRF | Pseudo-random Function |
| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network |
| SFR | Security Functional Requirement |
| SHA | Secure Hash Algorithm |
| SMTP | Simple Mail Transfer Protocol |
| SNMP | Simple Network Management Protocol |
| SOAP | Simple Object Access Protocol |
| TOE | Target of Evaluation |
| USB | Universal Serial Bus |
| WINS | Windows Internet Name Service |
| XML | Extensible Markup Language |

12 Bibliography

| ST | Hewlett-Packard LaserJet Enterprise MFP M525, M725, and M830 Series and Color LaserJet Enterprise MFP M575, M775, and M880 Series Firmware with Jetdirect Inside Security Target, Hewlett Packard, 2014-06-05, document version 2.0 |
|-----------|--|
| UG525 | HP LaserJet Enterprise MFP M525 - User Guide, Hewlett-Packard, May 2012, Edition 1 |
| UG525flow | HP LaserJet Enterprise flow MFP M525 - User Guide, Hewlett- Packard, November 2012, Edition 2 |
| UG575 | HP LaserJet Enterprise 500 color MFP M575 - User Guide, Hewlett- Packard, May 2012, Edition 1 |
| UG575flow | HP LaserJet Enterprise color flow MFP M575 - User Guide, Hewlett- Packard, November 2012, Edition 2 |
| UG725 | HP LaserJet Enterprise MFP M725 - User Guide, Hewlett-Packard, November 2012, Edition 2 |
| UG775 | HP LaserJet Enterprise 700 color MFP M775 - User Guide, Hewlett- Packard, October 2012, Edition 2 |
| UG830 | HP LaserJet Enterprise flow MFP M830 - User Guide, Hewlett- Packard, October 2013, Edition 1 |
| UG880 | HP Color LaserJet Enterprise flow MFP M880 - User Guide, Hewlett- Packard, November 2013, Edition 1 |
| CCcfg | Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for HP LaserJet MFPs - HP Color LaserJet Enterprise (M775, M880) MFP Series, HP LaserJet Enterprise (M525, M575, M725, M775, M830) MFP Series, Hewlett-Packard, May 2014, Edition 1 |
| CCadm | Common Criteria Administrator Operational Guide for HP LaserJet MFPs - HP Color LaserJet Enterprise (M775, M880) MFP Series, HP LaserJet Enterprise (M525, M575, M725, M775, M830) MFP Series. Hewlett-Packard, May 2014, Edition 1 |
| Download | Common Criteria Certification for HP LaserJet Printers, Hewlett- |

Packard, 2014-04-22

| CCpart1 | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1, version 3.1 revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001 |
|---------|---|
| CCpart2 | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2, version 3.1 revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-002 |
| CCpart3 | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3, version 3.1 revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-003 |
| CC | CCpart1 + CCpart2 + CCpart3 |
| CEM | Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-004 |
| SP-002 | SP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2013-09-30, document version 20.0 |
| SP-188 | SP-188 Scheme Crypto Policy, CSEC, 2013-06-18, document version 4.0 |