**Swedish Certification Body for IT Security**

# Certification Report HP CAM

**Issue: 1.0, 2014-dec-17**

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# 1      Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation, TOE, is the firmware of a multifunction printer, MFP, with the exception of the operating system and the crypto module implementation. Three versions of the multifunction printer are included in the scope of the evaluation: the LaserJet Enterprise MFP M630 Series (black and white), the Color LaserJet Enterprise MFP M680 Series, and the OfficeJet Enterprise Color MFP X585 Series (color). These multifunction printers provide fax, copying, scanning, and network printing functionality. The network connections are encrypted, password protected print jobs are encrypted, PIN protected print jobs are protected by access control, and stored jobs may be printed from the printer console.

The evaluated security features include administrator and user identification and authentication, PIN or password protected encryption of jobs, and IPSec protected network communication.

The implementation of the cryptographic module used for IPSec is outside the scope of the evaluation, but the effect of cryptographic function calls from the TOE has been verified. Other cryptographic implementations are within the scope of TOE.

The USB interface is disabled in the evaluated configuration.

The ST claims conformance to:

2600.2 PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment B; Version 1.0; March 2009, in accordance with the NIAP CCEVS Policy Letter #20. The claim includes the following packages from the PP:

2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational Environment B

2600.2-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR) Functions, Operational Environment B

2600.2-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational Environment B

2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational Environment B

2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational Environment B

2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-Medium Interface Functions, Operational Environment B

The evaluation has verified demonstrable conformance to the PP and conformance to the package claims stated above.

The evaluation has been performed by atsec information security AB in their premises in Danderyd, Sweden, and to some extent in the approved foreign location in Austin, Texas, USA, and was completed on the 10th of December 2014.

The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Criteria, version 3.1, release 4, and the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1, release 4. The evaluation was performed at the evaluation assurance level EAL 2, augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures.

atsec information security AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. atsec information security AB is is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC according to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria evaluation.

The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive versions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results confirm the security claims in the Security Target [ST], and have been reached in agreement with the requirements of the Common Criteria and the Common Methodology for evaluation assurance level:

EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2.

The certification results only apply to the versions of the products indicated in the certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target [ST] are met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CSEC or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate is either expressed or implied.

# 2      Identification

*Certification Identification*

| | |
|---|---|
| Certification ID | CSEC2014003 |
| Name and version of the certified IT product and the TOE | HP LaserJet Enterprise MFP M630 Series (M630dn w/optional fax, M630f, M630h, flow M630z) |
| | MFP firmware version 2303704_233000025 |
| | JetDirect firmware version JDI23s00424 |
| | HP Color LaserJet Enterprise MFP M680 Series (M680dn w/optional fax, M680f, flow M680z) |
| | MFP firmware version 2303704_233000027 |
| | JetDirect firmware version JDI23s00424 |
| | HP OfficeJet Enterprise Color MFP X585 Series (X585dn w/optional fax, X585f, flow X585z) |
| | MFP firmware version 2303704_233000026 |
| | JetDirect firmware version JDI23s00424 |
| Security Target | Hewlett-Packard LaserJet Enterprise MFP M630 Series, Color LaserJet Enterprise M680 Series and OfficeJet Enterprise Color MFP X585 Series Firmware with Jetdirect Inside Security Target, Hewlett Packard, 2014-10-15, document version 2.0 |
| Assurance level | EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2 |
| Sponsor | Hewlett Packard |
| Developer | Hewlett Packard |
| ITSEF | atsec information security AB |
| Common Criteria version | 3.1 release 4 |
| CEM version | 3.1 release 4 |
| Certification date | 2014-12-17 |

# 3 Security Policy

The TOE provides the following security services:

- Auditing
- Cryptography
- Identification and Authentication
- Data Protection and Access Control
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE Access Protection
- Trusted Channel Communication and Certificate Management
- User and Access Management

## 3.1 Auditing

The TOE generates audit records for security relevant events. The audit records are sent to a syslog server in the environment for storage and audit review.

## 3.2 Cryptography

The external communication channels are protected with IPSec (the IPSec implementation is part of the operational environment), and print jobs can be encrypted based on a password (the implementation of print job decryption is part of the TOE).

## 3.3 Identification and Authentication

Console access requires user identification and authentication.

## 3.4 Data Protection and Access Control

Stored jobs are protected by PIN (access control) or password (encryption). In addition, the access to read, modify and delete operations are controlled based on user identity and job ownership.

## 3.5 Protection of the TSF

Restricted forwarding - the administrator may restrict the automatic forwarding of data, specifically fax forwarding and fax archiving.

The TOE contains a suite of self tests to verify the integrity of specific TSF data and the TOE executables.

In the evaluated configuration, the TOE system clock will synchronise with an NTP server.

## 3.6 TOE Access Protection

Control panel access is protected by an inactivity timeout and an administrator selectable automatic logout after a user job has been started.

## 3.7 Trusted Channel Communication and Certificate Management

All network access to the TOE requires the use of an integrity and confidentiality protected trusted channel.

TOE provides a mechanism to import X.509 v3 certificates.

## 3.8      User and Access Management

An administrator has authority to manage security functionality, users, and the external authenticated servers.

# 4 Assumptions and Clarifications of Scope

## 4.1 Usage Assumptions

The Security Target [ST] makes three assumptions on the usage of the TOE.

A.USER.TRAINING - TOE users are aware of the security policies and the procedures of their organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and procedures.

A.ADMIN.TRAINING - Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer's guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures.

A.ADMIN.TRUST - Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.

## 4.2 Environmental Assumptions

Four assumptions on the environment are made in the Security Target.

A.ACCESS.MANAGED - The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE.

A.ADMIN.PC.SECURE - The administrative computer is in a physically secured and managed environment and only the authorized administrator has access to it.

A.USER.PC.POLICY - User computers are configured and used in conformance with the organization's security policies.

A.SERVICES.RELIABLE - When the TOE uses any of the network services CIFS, FTP, DNS, Kerberos, LDAP, NTP, SMTP, Sharepoint, syslog, and/or WINS, these services provide reliable information and responses to the TOE.

## 4.3 Clarification of Scope

The Security Target [ST] contains six threats, which have been considered during the evaluation.

T.DOC.DIS - User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.

T.DOC.ALT - User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.

T.FUNC.ALT - User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.

T.PROT.ALT - TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.

T.CONF.DIS - TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed by unauthorized persons.

T.CONF.ALT - TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.

# 5 Architectural Information

The TOE is the firmware of an enterprise network multifunction printer designed to be shared by many client computers and human users. It performs the functions of copying, faxing, printing, scanning, and storing of documents. It can be connected to a local network through the embedded Jetdirect Inside print server's built-in Ethernet, to an analog phone line using its internal analog fax modem, or to a USB device using its USB port (but the use of which must be disabled in the evaluated configuration).



Figure 1: HCD physical diagram

Figure 1 shows a high-level physical diagram of a Hardcopy Device (HCD) with the unshaded areas representing the TOE and the shaded areas indicating components that are part of the Operational Environment.

At the top of this figure is the Administrative Computer which connects to the TOE using Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) with X.509v3 certificates for both mutual authentication and for protection of data from disclosure and alteration. This computer can administer the TOE using the following interfaces over the IPsec connection:

● Embedded Web Server (EWS)

● Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)

● Web Services:

  - Open Extensibility Platform device (OXPd) Web Services

  - WS-* Web Services

The HTTP-based EWS administrative interface allows administrators to remotely manage the features of the TOE using a web browser.

The Web Services allow administrators to manage the TOE using HP's Web Jetadmin application, which is part of the Operational Environment. The TOE supports both HP's Open Extensibility Platform device (OXPd) Web Services and certain WS-* Web Services (conforming to the WS-*standards defined by w3.org) accessed via the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) and Extensible Markup Language (XML).

The SNMP network interface allows administrators to remotely manage the TOE using external SNMP-based administrative applications like the HP Web Jetadmin administrative tool.

Printer Job Language (PJL) is used in a non-administrative capacity by the Administrative Computer. The Administrative Computer uses PJL to send print jobs to the TOE as well as to receive job status. In general, PJL supports password protected administrative commands, but in the evaluated configuration these commands are disabled. For the purposes of the evaluation, we define the PJL Interface as PJL data sent to port 9100.

Web Jetadmin uses the HTTP, OXPd, PJL, SOAP/XML, WS-*, and SNMP protocols to manage the TOE. Remote applications such as web browsers and Web Jetadmin are part of the Operational Environment, not part of the TOE.

The TOE protects all network communications with Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), which is part of the embedded Jetdirect Inside firmware. Though IPsec supports multiple authentication methods, in the evaluated configuration, both ends of the IPsec connection are authenticated using X.509v3 certificates. An identity certificate for the TOE must be created outside the TOE, signed by a Certificate Authority (CA), and imported (added) into the TOE with the Certificate Authority's CA certificate.

Because IPsec authenticates the computers (IPsec authenticates the computer itself; IPsec does not authenticate the individual users of the computer), access to the Administrative Computer should be restricted to TOE administrators only.

The TOE distinguishes between the Administrative Computer and Network Client Computers by using IP addresses, IPsec, and the embedded Jetdirect Inside's internal firewall. In the evaluated configuration, the number of Administrative Computers used to manage the TOE is limited to one and the Device Administrator Password must be set.

The TOE can also communicate with Authenticated Server Computers using IPsec.

The evaluated configuration supports the following SNMP versions:

● SNMPv1 read-only

● SNMPv2c read-only

● SNMPv3

Network Client Computers connect to the TOE using IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect the communication and to mutually authenticate. These client computers can send print jobs to the TOE using the PJL Interface as well as receive job status.

The TOE supports an optional analog telephone line connection for sending and receiving faxes. The Control Panel uses identification and authentication to control access for sending analog faxes. Because the fax protocol doesn't support authentication of incoming analog fax phone line users, anyone can connect to the analog fax phone line (unless the number has been added to the Blocked Fax Numbers list), but the only function an incoming fax phone line user can perform is to transmit a fax to the TOE.

Received faxes are converted to stored jobs and placed in the "Stored Faxes" folder in the "Retrieve from Device Memory" application. Access to the "Stored Faxes" folder is restricted to users who have the "Open from Device Memory application > Stored Faxes" permission.

Some fax devices can hold a fax until another fax device requests that the fax be sent. Users can use the Fax Polling Receive function of the TOE to retrieve faxes from other fax devices. This is called a Fax Polling Receive job by this document. To perform this function, the user authenticates via the Control Panel and initiates the function by entering the phone number of the other fax device. The TOE will dial the other fax device and request the other fax device to transfer the held fax to the TOE via the currently active phone connection. The TOE prints the fax as it receives it.

The TOE does not accept polling requests from other fax devices (i.e., the MFP models in this evaluation do not contain the Fax Polling Send functionality).

The TOE protects stored jobs with either a 4-digit Job PIN or by accepting (and storing) a password encrypted job from a user computer. Both protection mechanisms are optional by default and are mutually exclusive of each other if used. In the evaluated configuration, every job must either be assigned a 4-digit Job PIN or be an encrypted job.

The TOE also supports Microsoft SharePoint (flow MFP models only) and remote file systems for the storing of scanned documents, sent and received faxes. The TOE uses IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect the communications and to mutually authenticate to SharePoint and the remote file systems. For remote file system connectivity, the TOE supports the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and the Common Internet File System (CIFS) protocol. (SharePoint is HTTP-based.) The product is capable of encrypting stored document files according to the Adobe PDF specification.

The TOE can be used to email scanned documents, email received faxes, or email sent faxes. The TOE supports protected communications between the TOE and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) gateways. It uses IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect the communications and to mutual authenticate with the SMTP gateway. The TOE can only protect unencrypted email up to the SMTP gateway. It is the responsibility of the Operational Environment to protect emails from the SMTP gateway to the email's destination. Also, the TOE can only send emails; it does not accept inbound emails.

The TOE's Control Panel supports both local and remote sign in methods. The local sign in method is called Local Device Sign In which supports individual user accounts. The user account information is maintained in the Local Device Sign In database within the TOE. The remote sign in methods are called LDAP Sign In and Windows Sign In (Kerberos). The TOE uses IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect both the LDAP and Kerberos communications.

Each HCD contains a user interface called the Control Panel. The Control Panel consists of a touch sensitive LCD screen, a physical power button, and a physical home screen button that are attached to the HCD. In addition, the flow MFP models include a computer keyboard as part of the Control Panel. The Control Panel is the physical interface that a user uses to communicate with the TOE when physically using the HCD. The LCD screen displays information such as menus and status to the user. It also provides virtual buttons to the user such as an alphanumeric keypad for entering usernames and passwords. When a user signs in at the Control Panel, a Permission Set is associated with their session which determines the functions the user is permitted to perform.

The Scanner is the part of the HCD that converts hardcopy documents into electronic format. ThePrint Engine converts electronic format into hardcopy.

All MFP models contain a persistent storage drive (a.k.a. storage drive) that resides in the Operational Environment. The storage drive contains a section called Job Storage which is a user-visible file system where stored print jobs are stored/held. Depending on the MFP model, the storage drive is either a:

● Solid-State Drive (SSD), or

● HP High Performance Secure Hard Disk

If the MFP model contains an SSD, all jobs in Job Storage are automatically deleted when the HCD is power-cycled. If the MFP model contains an HP High Performance Secure Hard Disk, the jobs can persist across power-cycles or can be deleted, depending on how the administrator configures the TOE and on the job type.

The TOE supports the auditing of security relevant functions by generating and forwarding audit records to a remote syslog server. The TOE uses IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect the communications between the TOE and the syslog server and to mutually authenticate the TOE and syslog server.

The Jetdirect Inside Firmware and HCD System Firmware components comprise the firmware on the system. They are shown as two separate components but they both share the same operating system (OS). The operating system is part of the Operational Environment. Both firmware components also contain an Embedded Web Server (EWS).

The Jetdirect Inside firmware includes SNMP, IPsec, a firewall, and the management functions for managing these network-related features. The Jetdirect Inside firmware also provides the network stack and drivers controlling the TOE's Ethernet interface.

The HCD System Firmware controls the overall functions of the TOE from the Control Panel to the storage drive to the print jobs.

# 6      Documentation

The following documents are included in the scope of the TOE:

LaserJet Enterprise MFP M630 - User Guide [UG630]

Color LaserJet Enterprise MFP M680 - User Guide [UG680]

OfficeJet Enterprise Color MFP X585/X585 Flow - User Guide [UG585]

TOE Download Instructions [Download]

Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for HP Multifunction Printers
[CCcfg]

# 7 IT Product Testing

## 7.1 Developer Testing

The developer performed testing of the security functionality, as described by the security functional requirements in the Security Target, covering both IP v.4 and IP v.6, for all three hardcopy devices (M630, M680, and X585). The developer testing was performed in the developer's premises in Boise, Idaho, USA.

## 7.2 Evaluator Testing

The evaluators focused on two of the hardcopy devices (M630 and M680), which were tested in the developer's premises in Boise, Idaho, USA.

The evaluators used the developer's test setup and verified a sample of the developer's test cases, covering all interfaces and security functions.

The evaluators also devised and performed additional test cases to provide full coverage of the security functions and TSFI.

## 7.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing

The evaluators performed variations of the functional tests to search for vulnerabilities in the TOE, and performed port scans of the network interface of the TOE, covering TCP and UDP ports both for IP v.4 and IP v.6. Testing variations was performed on the hardcopy devices M630 and M680, and port scans on M680, in Boise, Idaho, USA.

# 8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE shall run on either the M630, M680, or the X585 hardcopy device, and shall be configured in accordance with the CC Configuration Guide [CCcfg].

The following requirements applies to the evaluated configuration:

- HP Digital Sending Software (DSS) must be disabled
- HP High Performance Secure Hard Disk, if installed, must be configured with a password to activate drive encryption
- Device Administrator Password must be set
- Only one Administrative Computer is used to manage the TOE
- HP and third party applications cannot be installed on the TOE
- All non-fax stored jobs must be assigned a Job PIN or encrypted with a password
- PC Fax Send must be disabled
- Type A and B USB ports must be disabled
- Remote Firmware Upgrade through any means other than EWS must be disabled
- Jetdirect Inside management via telnet and FTP must be disabled
- Jetdirect XML Services must be disabled
- File System External Access must be disabled
- IPsec authentication using X.509v3 certificates must be enabled (IPsec authentication using Kerberos or Pre-Shared Key is not supported)
- IPsec Authenticated Headers (AH) must be disabled
- IPsec IKE Main Mode for key exchange must be used
- Full Authentication must be enabled (this disables the Guest account)
- SNMP support limited to:
  - ❍ SNMPv1 read-only
  - ❍ SNMPv2c read-only
  - ❍ SNMPv3
- The Service PIN, used by a customer support engineer to access functions available to HP support personnel, must be disabled
- Near Field Communication (NFC) must be disabled
- Wireless Direct Print must be disabled
- PJL device access commands must be disabled
- When using Windows Sign In, the Windows domain must reject Microsoft NT LAN Manager (NTLM) connections
- The "Save to HTTP" function is disallowed and must not be configured to function with an HTTP server
- Display Names for the Local Device Sign In method users and user names for the LDAP and Windows Sign In method users must only contain the characters defined in P.USERNAME.CHARACTER_SET in the ST.

# 9      Results of the Evaluation

The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.

The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluator and determined that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].

The evaluators overall verdict is PASS.

The verdicts for the respective assurance classes and components are summarised in the following table:

| Assurance Class/Family | Short name | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| Development | ADV | PASS |
|     Security Architecture | ADV_ARC.1 | PASS |
|     Functional Specification | ADV_FSP.2 | PASS |
|     TOE Design | ADV_TDS.1 | PASS |
| Guidance Documents | AGD | PASS |
|     Operational User Guidance | AGD_OPE.1 | PASS |
|     Preparative Procedures | AGD_PRE.1 | PASS |
| Life-cycle Support | ALC | PASS |
|     CM Capabilities | ALC_CMC.2 | PASS |
|     CM Scope | ALC_CMS.2 | PASS |
|     Delivery | ALC_DEL.1 | PASS |
|     Flaw Remediation | ALC_FLR.2 | PASS |
| Security Target Evaluation | ASE | PASS |
|     ST Introduction | ASE_INT.1 | PASS |
|     Conformance Claims | ASE_CCL.1 | PASS |
|     Security Problem Definition | ASE_SPD.1 | PASS |
|     Security Objectives | ASE_OBJ.2 | PASS |
|     Extended Components Definition | ASE_ECD.1 | PASS |
|     Security Requirements | ASE_REQ.2 | PASS |
|     TOE Summary Specification | ASE_TSS.1 | PASS |
| Tests | ATE | PASS |
|     Coverage | ATE_COV.1 | PASS |
|     Functional Tests | ATE_FUN.1 | PASS |
|     Independent Testing | ATE_IND.2 | PASS |
| Vulnerability Assessment | AVA | PASS |
|     Vulnerability Analysis | AVA_VAN.2 | PASS |

# 10      Evaluator Comments and Recommendations

The evaluators do not have any comments or recommendations concerning the product or using the product.

# 11 Glossary

| | |
|---|---|
| AES | Advanced Encryption Standard |
| AH | Authentication Header (IPsec) |
| CBC | Cipher Block Chaining |
| CIFS | Common Internet File System |
| CRV | Constrained Random Verification |
| CTS | Cipher Text Stealing |
| DNS | Domain Name System |
| ESP | Encapsulating Security Payload (IPsec) |
| EWS | Embedded Web Server |
| FTP | File Transfer Protocol |
| HCD | Hardcopy Device |
| HMAC | Hashed Message Authentication Code |
| HP | Hewlett-Packard |
| HTML | Hypertext Markup Language |
| http | Hypertext Transfer Protocol |
| IEEE | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. |
| IKE | Internet Key Exchange (IPsec) |
| IP | Internet Protocol |
| IPsec | Internet Protocol Security |
| ISAKMP | Internet Security Association Key Management Protocol (IPsec) |
| LCD | Liquid Crystal Display |
| LDAP | Lightweight Directory Access Protocol |
| MAC | Message Authentication Code |
| MFP | Multifunction Product |
| NTP | Network Time Protocol |
| OXP | Open Extensibility Platform |
| OXPd | OXP device layer |
| PIN | Personal Identification Number |
| PJL | Printer Job Language |
| PML | Printer Management Language |
| PRF | Pseudo-random Function |
| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network |
| SFR | Security Functional Requirement |
| SHA | Secure Hash Algorithm |
| SMTP | Simple Mail Transfer Protocol |
| SNMP | Simple Network Management Protocol |
| SOAP | Simple Object Access Protocol |
| TOE | Target of Evaluation |
| USB | Universal Serial Bus |
| WINS | Windows Internet Name Service |
| XML | Extensible Markup Language |

# 12    Bibliography

ST          Hewlett-Packard LaserJet Enterprise MFP M630 Series,
            Color LaserJet Enterprise MFP M680 Series, and
            OfficeJet Enterprise Color MFP X585 Series
            Firmware with Jetdirect Inside Security Target,
            Hewlett-Packard, 2014-10-15, document version 2.0

UG630       LaserJet Enterprise MFP M630 - User Guide, Hewlett-Packard,
            2014-09, Edition 2

UG680       Color LaserJet Enterprise MFP M680 - User Guide, Hewlett-Packard,
            2014-04, Edition 1

UG585       OfficeJet Enterprise Color MFP X585/X585 Flow - User Guide,
            Hewlett-Packard, 2014-04, Edition 1

CCcfg       Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for HP
            Multifunction Printers, Hewlett-Packard, 2014-09, Edition 1

Download    Common Criteria Certification for HP LaserJet Printers, Screen
            snapshot, Hewlett-Packard, 2014-04-22

CCpart1     Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
            Part 1, version 3.1 revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001

CCpart2     Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
            Part 2, version 3.1 revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-002

CCpart3     Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
            Part 3, version 3.1 revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-003

CC          CCpart1 + CCpart2 + CCpart3

CEM         Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
            Evaluation, version 3.1 revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-004

SP-002      SP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2014-11-06, document
            version 21.0

SP-188      SP-188 Scheme Crypto Policy, CSEC, 2013-06-18, document
            version 4.0

# Appendix A - QMS Consistency

During the certification project, the following versions of the quality management system (QMS) have been applicable since the certification application was received 2014-04-14:

QMS 1.16.1     valid from 2014-02-27

QMS 1.16.2     valid from 2014-07-07

QMS 1.17     valid from 2014-12-02

QMS 1.17.1     valid from 2014-12-03

In order to ensure consistency in the outcome of the certification, the certifier has examined the changes introduced in each update of the quality management system.

The changes between consecutive versions are outlined in "Ändringslista QMS 1.17.1".

The certifier concluded that, from QMS 1.16.1 to the current QMS 1.17.1, there are no changes with impact on the result of the certification.